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Making Higher Education Work: A Comparison of 
Discourses in the United Kingdom’s Conservative 
and Labour Parties’ General Election Manifestos 
between 1979 and 2010 
MANUEL SOUTO-OTERO 
This article elaborates a model of social democratic and conservative discourses in 
relation to access, ﬁnancing, management, and results of higher education. The model 
is contrasted with the position of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party in the 
United Kingdom from the late 1970s to 2010 as expressed in their electoral manifestos. 
The ﬁndings show how the ideological differences between parties diminished over 
time, although not uniformly across themes. Explanations for this trend are provided 
through examination of the role of electoral institutions and “median voter” and “po­
litical partisanship” arguments. 
Introduction 
Much of the contemporary literature on education policy distinguishes be­
tween the policies of different governments by reference to political ideology. 
However, there are signiﬁcant contradictions in the results reported in this 
literature. The United Kingdom’s experience is paradigmatic in this respect, 
as reﬂected in the many accounts of the ideological values behind the “Third 
Way” (Giddens 1998) once espoused by “New Labour.” Differing accounts 
of the nature of contemporary education policies stem partly from the ab­
sence of a shared deﬁnition of social democratic aims and conservative aims 
in education as well as from continuous changes in political vocabulary (Dale 
1989) and conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). Given these difﬁculties, 
much education policy analysis is grounded in a form of abstract empiricism 
that conforms neither to classic political ideology models nor to more recent 
theorizations of party policy change. 
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In order to address the problem of abstract empiricism, this article draws 
on work in political science and education to sketch a model of both social 
democratic and conservative arguments in relation to four themes in higher 
education (HE) policy: access, ﬁnancing, management, and results. This model 
is proposed as a lens through which to conduct analysis and to avoid a purely 
inductive construct of the categories used to review social democratic and 
conservative discourses (Budge and Pennings 2007). The focus is on HE, an 
area that has been less studied than has compulsory education regarding par­
tisan differences, although it has received more political attention in the past 
3 decades, often linked to discussions on its role in economic growth.1 
While general ideological features can be identiﬁed for both parties, these 
ideologies are neither consistent nor static. Rather, they present a ﬁeld for 
political struggle, for continuous shaping and reshaping. The conﬂict be­
tween the decentralizing logic of markets in education and the centralizing 
logic of governmental prescription and controlling standards has long trou­
bled the Conservative Party (Pierson 1998). Labour has also struggled be­
tween alternative conceptions of education, including those of the “New 
Right,” developmentalism, and the “new social democracy” (Paterson 2003; 
Whitty 2009). 
This article addresses two questions: (1) What are the differences and 
similarities between the Labour and the Conservative discourses regarding 
HE in their UK general election manifestos, and how have their discourses 
evolved over time? (2) Can we explain these discursive positions and trajec­
tories by looking at electoral politics? The analysis presented here is based 
on an examination of UK general election manifestos from 1979 to 2010. 
The manifestos reviewed are for UK elections. The discussion thus applies 
mainly to England. HE has been subject to a process of devolution of political 
competences since the late 1990s that has accentuated differences between 
UK countries in this area. 
The next section presents an outline of possible social democratic and 
conservative positions on HE. This is followed, in section 3, by a description 
of the methodology employed in the study. Section 4 presents an analysis of 
electoral manifestos to explore how parties conform to their expected po­
sitions and discusses possible causes for deviations from these. Section 5 
concludes. 
Social Democracy, Conservatism, and Higher Education 
In this section, I engage with literature in the ﬁelds of education and 
political science. The education literature has focused on ways in which ed­
ucation policy has moved toward neoliberal positions. The political science 
1 See, e.g., Power and Whitty (1999) and Whitty (2009). 
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literature, in contrast, has emphasized differences between parties on the left 
and on the right in their views of educational issues. 
The “golden age of the welfare state” (mid-1940s to the mid-1970s) was 
a period of unprecedented economic growth that funded the expansion of 
social programs from conservative and, in particular, social democratic parties 
in advanced industrialized countries, although to varying degrees depending 
on the country (Esping-Andersen and van Kersbergen 1992). In the United 
Kingdom, a second deﬁning characteristic of the period was the marked 
ideological differences between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party 
on a wide range of social issues (Kuypers et al. 2003; Dumbrell 2004). In the 
battle between the two parties during this time, the Conservatives were, on 
the whole, winning: they achieved around twice as many parliamentary ma­
jority wins as Labour did between 1900 and 1997. 
The Conservative discourse regarding the economy became increasingly 
radical as the century progressed. Whereas the party had previously expanded 
social programs, from the late 1970s onward the welfare state came under 
pressure from Thatcher’s New Right. A consensus arose that only neoliberal 
policies could work under the new circumstances prompted by the oil crisis, 
the increased volatility of ﬁnancial markets, and globalization (Boix 1998). 
Thatcher, like Reagan in the United States, worked to create new institutional 
opportunities for intellectual and political advocates of free-market econom­
ics to inﬂuence policy-making agendas and to transform formerly margin­
alized economic perspectives into a set of legitimate policy goals, of which 
one hallmark was “small government” and welfare state retrenchment 
(Pierson 1994). According to the Conservatives, welfare states were in conﬂict 
with economic efﬁciency; they were “eating the hand that fed them” (Esping-
Andersen 2006).2 This view led to the abandonment of Keynesian demand-
side policies based on a mixed economy, with high government intervention 
in the economy and vigorous public spending to stimulate economic activity 
and reduce unemployment, especially in times of crisis. Feedback mecha­
nisms and path-dependent developments derived from the establishment of 
social policies that created their own constituencies—large groups of bene­
ﬁciaries, which included the working class and the middle class—prevented 
strong cutbacks in welfare spending, at least initially (Pierson 1994, 1996). 
However, expansion of such spending would not continue. 
Labour’s electoral base, the working class, was at the same time in decline 
in the United Kingdom. Profound social changes were taking place due to 
new forms of employment and the expansion of the service sector, which 
gave birth to novel electoral dynamics and questioned previous political al­
liances (Mann 1973, 1985). Trade unions, another Labour stronghold, were 
noticeably weakened under Thatcher (Towers 1989). In this context (the 
2 The supposed trade-off between social spending and economic efﬁciency has been questioned 
by Atkinson and Mogensen (1993) and Iversen and Stephens (2008), among others. 
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1990s), the Labour Party adopted a “new social democracy,” which differed 
from old-style social democracy and neoliberalism, to appeal to a wider con­
stituency. It accepted the market, but not all of its outcomes, and made 
commitments to full employment in “good jobs” and a “social investment 
State” (Green-Pedersen et al. 2001). Alongside other measures—such as a 
robust macroeconomic policy, responsive wage bargaining, and “employment­
friendly tax policies”—education and training formed the core of this model, 
labeled the Third Way under New Labour (see Blair and Schro¨der 1999).3 
Labour followed Third Way politics until its defeat in the 2010 elections 
(Giddens 2007; Ball et al. 2011). 
The view endorsed by much of the education literature is that conser­
vative, particularly New Right, policies came to dominate HE globally (see 
Torres and Schugurensky 2002). Two distinct conservative perspectives can 
be differentiated regarding HE. According to the ﬁrst, HE should not be 
concerned with the employability of students or with producing a qualiﬁed 
labor force for the economy (Oakeshott 1989); HE is seen as a good in itself, 
an opportunity for development. The second perspective emphasizes links 
between HE, employability, future income streams, and economic develop­
ment (Hayek 1960; Becker 1964). The New Right that appeared in the 1970s 
was much more inﬂuenced by the Austrian school of economics and Friedrich 
Hayek than by the conservatism of Michael Oakeshott. The post-1940s central 
social democratic values—concerning equity, accessibility, and autonomy, or 
the contribution of HE to social transformation—were overshadowed in the 
1980s by the values espoused in the “conservative turn” (Apple 1996; Levy 
2006)—self-responsibility, individualization, excellence and efﬁciency, in­
creased “choice for consumers,” changes in the public-private provision mix, 
decentralization, and ﬁnancial cutbacks (Olssen 2004). In this way, education 
became a tool for socialization into capitalist values (Giroux 2003) or global 
competitiveness (Brown et al. 2001; Souto-Otero 2007). Signiﬁcant elements 
in Labour’s policy on education in England have been a continuation of 
Conservatives’ policies. Some authors have seen this continuation as the result 
of Labour’s need to respond to global challenges (Ball 2001); other authors 
have seen this continuation simply as a product of inertia provoked by the 
Conservatives’ previous actions and inactions (Lunt 2008). 
Political science analyses have focused ﬁrst on how political parties’ ed­
ucation policy choices satisfy their “core constituencies” (assumed for the 
Conservative Party to be the most well-off and for Labor to be the least well-
off ) and “swing voters,” as well as how national political institutions and the 
distribution of power between Left and Right parties mediate global trends 
within countries. Second, this literature has tended to rely on quantitative 
cross-national analysis and does not sufﬁciently take into account either na­
3 Some authors, though, are skeptical about whether the Third Way differs much from old European 
social democracy or even Christian democracy (see Navarro 2002). 
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tional variations in the nature of social democratic and conservative party 
ideologies across Western democracies (Anderson 2005) or the national struc­
turing of skills formation systems. The analyses presented in this article thus 
are modeled on some important simpliﬁcations. 
In response to the argument that social democrats moved ideologically 
to the right, one school of political scientists argues that differences with 
conservatives are still signiﬁcant: heavy investment in education and public 
physical infrastructures (the supply side of the economy) has become the 
distinctive social democratic strategy in the absence of demand-side Keynesian 
policies. Carles Boix (1998) argues that social democratic governments invest 
heavily in human capital formation to enhance national competitiveness. This 
can be combined with high taxation to enable greater levels of social pro­
tection for the least well-off. Conservative parties prioritize containing taxes 
and public expenditure, including expenditure in supply-side measures, to 
enable greater private productive investment and growth (Boix 1998; Iversen 
and Stephens 2008). 
In contrast, a second school of political scientists argues that investment 
in HE is regressive: it beneﬁts the better-off in society and is thus more 
conducive to conservative ideology (Wilensky 2002). Conservatives appeal to 
the upper and middle classes by emphasizing the role of HE in promoting 
“equality of opportunity” and saving in social protection investment that favors 
the least well-off through equality of outcomes. Ben Ansell (2008) reports 
that when enrollment levels are low, right-wing parties invest in and expand 
HE to attract middle classes, whereas left-wing parties oppose this expansion. 
However, partisan preferences reverse once the HE system has expanded, 
because it then captures people from wider social strata and starts to also 
beneﬁt the working class. 
A third set of authors (Apple 1997; Mellizo-Soto 2005) argues that not 
only the degree but also the aims and design of educational investments are 
relevant. They postulate that conservative and social democratic policies in 
postcompulsory education are guided by different principles (e.g., conser­
vative meritocratic versus social democratic compensatory principles). 
The arguments presented above are, thus, not conclusive in relation to 
what could be expected from Labour Party and Conservative Party positions 
on HE. In the content analysis presented below, I examine differences be­
tween parties, often downplayed in the education literature, and assess the 
degree to which the rhetoric of the Labour and the Conservative parties 
conforms to Boix’s or Wilensky’s propositions regarding access and ﬁnancing 
(aspects that Wilensky predicts will be emphasized by conservative parties 
and that Boix suggests will be stressed by social democrats). I also explore 
management (hypothesizing that UK Conservatives will emphasize efﬁciency 
gains, choice, and privatization given their emphasis on a small government 
and individual sovereignty; see Tullock and Buchannan 1965) and results 
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(hypothesizing that UK Conservative manifestos will emphasize the needs of 
the economy and that UK Labour manifestos will emphasize social results, 
linked to the compensatory principle). I then review whether observed dif­
ferences between parties coexist with a general movement toward conser­
vative positions and the recentering of the debate on HE, a dynamic aspect 
that has been attended to in the education literature but has been largely 
ignored in the political science literature. 
Methodology 
My article is based on a content analysis of the Labour and Conservative 
parties’ electoral manifestos produced in the period 1979–2010. Content 
analysis studies examine human communications by systematically identifying 
speciﬁed characteristics of the channels through which they operate, com­
munications messages themselves (e.g., the frequency of key words and the 
structure of communication), and the recipients of the communications (Hol­
sti 1969). Given that the channels for the message analyzed (i.e., printed and 
online electoral manifestos) and the recipients of the communication ana­
lyzed (i.e., the electorate) are similar for both parties, I focus on the content 
of their respective manifestos’ messages. My aim is to categorize the manifest 
and latent content of a body of communicated material to ascertain its mean­
ing and probable effects (i.e., what the analyzed material enables and what 
it prevents; Krippendorff 2004). While there is enormous diversity in ap­
proach to content analysis (Merten 1983)—from word counts to analyses of 
document sections, spread, and meaning—what these approaches have in 
common is that they offer something often missing in other forms of social 
critique, namely, close analysis of texts and interactions through an empiri­
cally grounded method (Titscher et al. 2000). 
Content analysis is particularly relevant in the UK context. As Norman 
Fairclough (2000) argues, if language is important in politics, it is crucial for 
the politics of New Labour precisely because of the ambiguities in its rhetoric. 
Sociological analyses of education policy that ignore discourse risk overlooking 
its important role in shaping and legitimizing policy (Ball 1990). This article 
focuses speciﬁcally on parties’ manifestos. In doing so, it thus necessarily omits 
what happens between elections and the differences between electoral pledges 
and actual policy. Those aspects are more deeply explored in the literature 
than political discourses are (for excellent reviews of UK HE policy, see Barnett 
[1990, 1994]; Halsey [1995]; and Barr and Crawford [2005]). 
Educational policies are formulated, reformulated, delivered, and inter­
preted by politicians and policy makers, civil servants, teachers, parents, and 
a wide range of stakeholders in an array of documents, practices, and behaviors. 
Political parties’ electoral manifestos are only a part of this, but a focus on 
such manifestos is warranted by several factors. Electoral manifestos are relevant 
as a salient forum for expressing the ofﬁcial dicta of political parties to their 
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electorates. These manifestos therefore have a strong symbolic value (Laver et 
al. 2003; Franzmann and Kaiser 2006; Souto-Otero and Whitworth 2006) and 
directly measure what parties publicly state as their position (Budge and Pen­
nings 2007). There are no institutional arrangements that force parties to keep 
their electoral promises. The threat of electoral punishment for dishonoring 
electoral pledges may encourage politicians to follow their stated policies. How­
ever, voting is a rough mechanism for accountability because the public is often 
unaware of the changes made in relation to electoral promises, because policies 
may not have their desired effects, and because past performance is only one 
of the bases that determines voting behavior (see Maravall 2003). Moreover, 
unexpected contingencies and crises can force parties to move away from their 
original promises “legitimately” in the eyes of the electorate. In spite of these 
factors, and other notable inconsistencies between a party’s manifestos and 
that party’s actions once elected, the empirical literature has found that, for 
the most part, manifestos are good predictors of government policy (Klingh­
emann et al. 1994). At the very least, they are an important resource for the 
understanding of proposed education policy. 
I employed the Labour Party and Conservative Party electoral manifestos 
directly. This allowed me to go deeper in the analysis than widely used man­
ifestos’ content databases (e.g., the Electoral Manifestos Project of the Berlin 
Social Science Research Center [Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialfor­
schung]) because such databases provide scant information on education issues 
(see Jakobi 2009). To initially assess the importance of HE for each party and 
over time, the number of references made to “education” and “higher edu­
cation/university/college/polytechnic” (coded together) were annotated for 
each manifesto. To obtain a more nuanced view of the importance of HE, the 
inclusion or absence of a subsection on HE was recorded. The length of the 
main discussion on HE, proportional to the manifesto’s length, was also cal­
culated. Finally, the spread of the referencing to HE in other sections of the 
manifesto was documented, to assess the extent to which HE was a transversal 
theme. This mapping was complemented by an in-depth review of HE-related 
content within each manifesto. The four main topics for this analysis (access, 
ﬁnancing, management, and results) were selected a priori, as being key in 
current policy debates. The list, of course, is selective and for reasons of space 
excludes other topics that have also been subject to political debate. Likewise, 
the analysis cannot always cover all topics in the utmost nuance; thus, further 
analyses would complement the arguments proposed here. 
Labour and Conservative HE Discourses (1979–2010) 
General Overview 
Table 1 presents results from the analysis of the frequency of key words 
in the two parties’ manifestos and the speciﬁc location of the key words in 
each manifesto. It shows that the difference in the number of references to 
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TABLE 1

Labour Party and Conservative Party Discourses in Relation to Education (1979–2010) 
1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
Manifesto length: 
Conservative 9,100 12,350 18,300 30,700 21,800 12,500 7,300 28,700 
Labour 9,600 23,600 9,400 12,800 18,300 20,900 22,500 30,200 
Education:*,† 
Conservative 10.99 8.91 16.39 13.36 15.60 3.20 19.18 6.62 
Labour 13.54 25.00 31.91 28.91 25.14 28.71 23.11 19.87 
HE:* 
Conservative 1.10 5.67 9.29 5.54 2.75 7.20 8.22 5.92 
Labour 3.13 2.97 5.33 3.13 3.83 12.44 5.78 9.27 
Subsection:‡ 
Conservative N Y Y Y N Y N Y 
Labour Y Y N N Y Y Y Y 
Share:§ 
Conservative .7 1.5 1.6 .6 .5 1.5 .6 1.4 
Labour .7 .3 2.0 .9 .4 1.6 1.0 1.0 
Spread:k 
Conservative 1 3 1 4 2 4 2 4 
Labour 1 3 1 2 3 9 6 8 
Note.—My elaboration from parties’ manifestos. HE p higher education; N p no; Y p yes. 
* Mentions of word/expression per 10,000 words. 
† Includes higher education/university/college/polytechnic institute. References to the University for Industry ini­
tiative, which mainly provides training on basic skills, are excluded. References to university technical colleges, which 
do not teach at the higher education level, are excluded for 2010. 
‡ Existence of a subsection mainly on HE. 
§ Word share (%) of the manifesto taken by main discussion on HE—regardless of whether this is a separate 
subsection or not. 
k Number of subsections in which HE/university/college are mentioned—the number of subsections varies between 
manifestos but is generally large and fairly compact—between 50 and 80—except for the 2005 election, when Labour’s 
manifesto had over 100 subsections and the Conservatives’ manifesto fewer than 20. Excludes mentions in case study 
boxes about cities with a university or similar institution in which nothing is said about HE. 
“education” as a general term in the Labour and Conservative manifestos 
was relatively narrow in 1979 and in 2005. In the rest of the period analyzed, 
however, Labour devoted much greater attention to education than did Con­
servatives, more than doubling Conservative mentions of “education” except 
in 1987 and 1997. The situation is very different with HE up until 1997, as 
HE occurred substantially less in Labour than in Conservative manifestos, 
particularly in the 1980s and up until 1997, coinciding with the arrival of 
New Labour. In the following four elections (1997–2010), Labour devoted 
more attention to HE than did the Conservatives, except for 2005. The con­
text is one of resurgence in the importance of HE in the 2000s’ manifestos 
after a dip in the 1990s and a reversal of the leading party: the Conservatives’ 
mean number of mentions of HE for the two elections in the 1980s is 7.48; 
in the two elections in the 1990s, 4.14; and in the three elections in the 
2000s, 7.11.4 For Labour, the averages were 4.15 in the 1980s (55.5 percent 
in relation to the Conservatives); 3.48 in the 1990s (84.1 percent); and 9.16 
in the 2000s (128.8 percent). 
4 The mean numbers were obtained by summing the number of mentions of HE per 10,000 words 
in each manifesto for a given decade and dividing the result by the number of elections in that decade— 
e.g., (9.29 � 5.67)/2 for the Conservative Party in the 1980s. 
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The next three indicators, on “subsection,” “share,” and “spread,” mea­
sure the location of the references to HE in the manifestos. As can be seen 
in the table, both parties had a subsection for HE in their manifestos more 
often than not (the Conservatives, ﬁve out of eight times; and Labour, six 
out of eight). The main difference has appeared recently: whereas the Con­
servatives had a subsection in only two of the last four elections (1997–2010), 
Labour had an HE subsection in all four manifestos since 1997, reversing 
the trend of 1987 and 1992. The table indicates a more mixed result in 
relation to the share of the manifesto devoted to the main discussions on 
HE. Although here Labour took the lead in four elections since 1979, against 
three for the Conservatives and one tie, each party led on two elections since 
1997—even though the 2010 Conservative HE lead is somewhat disputable 
because the HE section in their 2010 manifesto (entitled “Improve Skills and 
Strengthen Higher Education”) contains substantial references to non-HE 
issues, whereas New Labour’s HE sections were more focused on HE through­
out the period. 
Finally, regarding the degree to which HE is embedded in other parts of 
the manifestos, Labour made references to HE in the same or in fewer 
sections of its manifestos than the Conservatives did in the period 1979–92. 
However, this trend was reversed in 1997, with notable differences in the 
three elections from 2001 on: the number of Labour references to HE in 
other sections tripled those of the Conservatives—although the 2005 ﬁgures 
provide a distorted vision, since it was the only election besides 1987 in which 
one party’s manifesto had more than twice as many sections as the other 
party’s had. 
This suggests two fairly distinct Labour periods. Up to the arrival of New 
Labour’s Third Way, the Labour Party gave greater importance to education 
than the Conservative Party did, HE excluded. From 1997 to 2010, however, 
Labour concentrated more strongly on the supply side of the economy and 
education. Throughout the period of analysis, Conservatives’ measures have 
tended to remain more constant than Labour’s. However, the actual content 
of the proposed policies is more important than the frequency of references 
to HE in electoral manifestos. This is analyzed below. 
Conservative Party Discourses in Manifestos 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were a time of signiﬁcant economic 
recession in the United Kingdom. Thatcher’s New Right argued that all 
major stakeholders had a common interest in raising productivity and prof­
its to improve real living standards for everyone in a high-productivity, high-
wage, low-tax economy. The 1979 Conservative manifesto highlighted the 
weaknesses of the British economy, claimed those weaknesses had led to 
substantial industrial unrest and strikes, and outlined its strategy to improve 
the economy. 
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The Conservatives took advantage of this context to put forward an in­
strumental view of education, referring to its crucial role for the United 
Kingdom’s recovery to prosperity. Education, Conservatives held, could not 
help in the economic recovery if it was doomed by low standards (Conser­
vative Party 1979). However, raising standards should be done without in­
creasing public expenditure, in line with Conservatives’ argument that public 
investment should take place within the limits of “what the taxpayer can 
afford” (Conservative Party 1979, 7). Their discourse stressed that increased 
efﬁciency within existing budgetary allocations was possible (Conservative 
Party 1979, 1983) and that, as a result, budgetary control ought not jeopardize 
opportunities for access. They claimed that more people could access HE 
thanks to “generous support systems” (Conservative Party 1992, 24; and see 
1997, 20) and that high standards in HE could be provided at constant costs 
to the taxpayer: “We are committed to widening opportunities without com­
promising academic standards” (Conservative Party 1992, 22), through better 
use of available resources. 
References to the value of research and scholarship for their own sake 
were undermined by the need for economic relevance (Conservative Party 
1987). In spite of a token reference to “research and scholarship for their 
own sake” (Conservative Party 1987, 10), the complexity of the conservative 
tradition in its view of HE was not reﬂected in their manifestos. Conservatives 
proposed increasing the budget only for ﬁelds that they viewed as directly 
affecting economic development and international competitiveness, such as 
technological, scientiﬁc, and engineering courses (Conservative Party 1983, 
1987, 1992): “Our universities and polytechnics, too, must generate new ideas 
and train the skilled workforce of the next generation. . . . The  very large  
sums of public money now going to higher education must be spent in the 
most effective way. Within that budget, we want to see a shift toward tech­
nological, scientiﬁc and engineering courses” (Conservative Party 1983, 14). 
The necessity for HE to be economically relevant was thought to be the 
only way into international competitiveness and out of welfare dependence 
in the context of globalization: “Developing economies are able to provide 
highly-skilled labour at a fraction of the costs of British labour. The only way 
we can compete is by dramatically improving the skills of Britain’s workforce. 
. . . A Conservative government will not accept another generation being 
consigned to an uncertain future of worklessness and dependency” (Con­
servative Party 2010, 16). Conservatives also stressed initially the role of ed­
ucation as a tool to create equality of opportunity, at the expense of measures 
that promoted equality outcomes through social spending, to appeal to a 
wider spectrum of voters. The meritocratic discourse was incorporated despite 
the poor performance of education alone as a single mechanism for social 
mobility in the United Kingdom (see Goldthorpe and Mills 2005; Souto-
Otero 2010). Expanding HE access from the low level of the 1980s meant, 
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de facto, increasing access for the middle classes. By 1987 the Conservatives 
argued that there had been a substantial improvement in access to HE under 
their government, with one in four young people going into HE in the mid­
1980s, compared to one in eight at the beginning of the 1980s (Conservative 
Party 1987) and a high rate of degree completion. The Conservatives nev­
ertheless explicitly committed themselves in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
to a further expansion of the system and to widening participation by making 
new funds available to students through top-up loans instead of further grants: 
“We will continue to expand the number of students in HE. . . . We are 
abolishing the artiﬁcial ‘binary line’ between universities and polytechnics” 
in order to give HE access to a third of young people by the year 2000 
(Conservative Party 1992, 24).5 
According to the Conservatives, these measures would help reinforce the 
image of education as a level playing ﬁeld. Yet the ﬁeld was far from level. 
Selection of students by traditional universities continued to be highly strat­
iﬁed, and the individual student’s decision to continue study depended cru­
cially on family background (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997; Breen 2005). 
In the 1980s, the Conservatives had been committed to access and widening 
participation to help children from all backgrounds to achieve HE credentials. 
After the system had expanded to the middle classes, the Conservatives’ interest 
in access and widening participation dwindled in the early 1990s; it reappeared 
only in 2010 under a new “Compassionate Conservatism” (see my “Conclusions” 
section). During the 2001 and 2005 elections, the Conservatives advocated the 
abolition of student fees approved by Labour, in a new move to attract the 
middle classes, who beneﬁt disproportionately from HE. In that period, core 
principles of the Conservatives that had been largely absent in their manifestos 
during the 1990s were recovered: competition, choice, and specialization. Fur­
thermore, whereas government intervention to ensure standards was defended 
until 1997, from that date on—with the Conservatives in opposition—the route 
to “excellence” was linked to government withdrawal from HE, to free it of 
the “threat from interference by politicians” (Conservative Party 2001, 5; 2010, 
17). Additionally, HE ﬁnancial independence through individual endowments 
paid for by “future asset sales and the reform of student loans” (Conservative 
Party 2001, 4) would “free” universities from reliance on state funding (Con­
servative Party 2001, 8; 2005, 9). Universities would be encouraged to establish 
joint university-business research and development institutes, although the im­
portance of fundamental research was also recognized (Conservative Party 
2010). In other words, the Conservatives’ position was that universities should 
become more “private” and deregulated. 
5 Loans are a favored Conservative option, on the assumption that making loans available for 
poorer students mitigates the negative effect on access produced by privatizing the costs of attending 
HE (see Friedman 1955). 
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Labour Party Discourses in Manifestos 
Labour’s discourse in the 1970s and 1980s was different from that of the 
Conservatives in two main respects: it defended spreading opportunity 
through widening access to a university education, putting greater emphasis 
on the compensatory principle, and it supported an active state role in the 
management of the education system. Moreover, Labour made no reference 
to choice or competition among institutions during the period analyzed 
(1979–2010). Equality of opportunity was the guiding principle of Labour’s 
education policy during the 1980s. The Labour Party (1979, 1987) thus ar­
gued for increasing and widening participation in HE for people from “work­
ing-class backgrounds” (Labour Party 1979, 1983) in contrast to more general 
Conservative commitments to “expand” and “widen participation” without 
signaling particular target groups. Furthermore, Labour aimed to widen par­
ticipation of adult learners (Labour Party 1979, 8; 1983, 16, 24; 1987). To 
achieve this, the Open University and the grant system would be enhanced 
and Conservative proposals for student loans explicitly rejected (Labour Party 
1983, 24). Access became an even more central aim in the mid-1980s. La­
bour’s 1983 manifesto declared that its policy for education was based on 
reversing the “Tory’s cuts to restore the right of all qualiﬁed young people 
seeking HE to secure a place” and on “substantially expand[ing] opportu­
nities for adults in . . .  higher education” (Labour Party 1983, 24) as a “second 
chance for personal development” (Labour Party 1987, 10). 
Thus, in contrast to the Conservatives’ rhetoric regarding increased ef­
ﬁciency as the key to maintaining quality and access to HE, Labour argued 
that increased resources were necessary. This increase was initially proposed 
to come from public sources and not from top-up tuition fees, which Labour 
promised not to introduce (Labour Party 2001). Investment in education 
could increase as a share of national income as the costs of unemployment 
fell (Labour Party 1997). In 2001, after a ﬁrst term of relative ﬁnancial aus­
terity, the Labour Party (2001) claimed to have made a substantial commit­
ment to increase education spending (at all levels) from 4.7 percent of na­
tional income in 1997 to 5.5 percent in 2005 (Labour Party 2005, 33). 
However, the discourse soon turned to diversifying funding sources to com­
plement public investment in HE, following the introduction of top-up fees 
and greater calls for collaboration with the private sector. 
Coming more in line with Conservative proposals, Labour argued that 
the cost of student maintenance should be increasingly borne by graduates, 
through loans (an instrument that Labour had explicitly rejected in its 1983 
and 1992 manifestos) to be repaid on an income-related basis and under 
longer payback periods than advocated by the Conservatives (Labour Party 
1997). Labour suggested that the continuing underrepresentation of “non­
traditional” groups in HE might result from their lack of information and 
aspiration as much as from their ﬁnancial concerns. Labour stressed the 
304 August 2011 
MAKING HIGHER EDUCATION WORK 
importance of disseminating the economic beneﬁts of HE and argued for 
outreach projects to attract more students from nontraditional backgrounds 
(Labour Party 2010). The implication was that individuals, not only the state, 
needed to address the existing shortcomings in access. In this period, Labour 
saw as the main role for government the solution of “market failures” in 
terms of lack information/credit, in stark contrast with Labour’s earlier po­
sition, in which the state was to actively promote access. The party nevertheless 
remained committed to “expanding” and “widening” access to achieve social 
mobility (Labour Party 2010) and covered these topics in greater depth than 
the Conservatives did. 
Along with its evolution on the issue of ﬁnancing, the Labour Party 
increasingly, starting in the late 1980s, saw HE as an ingredient of economic 
vitality as well as a foundation for fairness (Labour Party 1987), thus closing 
the gap between the two parties in their debates on the purpose of HE. 
Labour argued that “merit comes before privilege” and that “life-chances 
should be for all the people . . . whatever their background” (Labour Party 
2001, 1, 3). However, the 1997 Labour manifesto also saw education as a tool 
to combat inﬂation, low growth, and unemployment. The 2001 Labour man­
ifesto did argue for an expansion of HE and set out a 10-year target to increase 
participation to 50 percent for those under age 30. HE expansion would be 
achieved, Labour stated, primarily through the introduction of vocationally 
oriented 2-year Foundation Degree programs designed to offer a profession­
ally relevant HE qualiﬁcation as a way into skilled work or further study 
(Labour Party 2001, 2005, 2010). As the Conservatives had suggested in the 
1980s, expansion should come also, Labour now proposed, from “science, 
technology, engineering and maths as well as applied areas of study in key 
economic growth sectors” (Labour Party 2010, 31). Targets in 2010 combined 
HE with advanced apprenticeships and technician training, with 75 percent 
of the population below age 30 going into any of these routes (Labour Party 
2010). 
Labour expressed the increasingly signiﬁcant link between education and 
the labor market with progressive force from the early 1990s and, in particular, 
under the Third Way, which no longer included solidarity and equality as 
core values of the political Left. Values such as opportunity, responsibility, 
and fairness became central. The state’s job was to guarantee the provision 
of an “adequate education,” deﬁned instrumentally as education that would 
enable individuals to have the opportunity to participate in the labor market. 
The rationale for expanding HE was clearly presented in economic terms: 
“Higher education brings on average 20 percent higher earning and a 50 
percent lower chance of unemployment. It is time for a historic commitment 
to open higher education to half of all young people before they are 30, 
combined with increased investment to maintain academic standards” (La­
bour Party 2001, 29). 
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In the 1990s, and in line with previous Conservative Party proposals from 
the late 1970s, Labour identiﬁed university links with industry as an area to 
be strengthened (Labour Party 1992), and references to adult learners and 
self-development disappeared. The need to defend the world-class reputation 
of British university education and the importance of its links with economic 
prosperity (e.g., Conservative Party 1979, 1987, 1992) were themes that La­
bour incorporated into its discourse (Labour Party 1997, 2000, 2005, 2010). 
Entrepreneurship was to be fostered: “Every college and university should 
be twinned with a business champion” (Labour Party 2005, 23). This focus 
on the economic importance of knowledge and HE was largely at the expense 
of earlier Labour views of education as a tool for social and political eman­
cipation, which traditionally have been linked to the Left (Peers 1958). In 
fact, going one step further than Conservative arguments, Labour argued 
that HE itself should be seen as a business and managed as such: “We must 
seize the opportunity to develop education, in particular higher education, 
as a great export business. Universities will be encouraged to develop inter­
national links. . . . We  want the Open University . . . to reach the global 
market in distance learning” (Labour Party 2010, 13). 
The education discourse advocated both by Labour and by the Conser­
vatives became both technical and political—technical in its orientation to­
ward producing the “individuals” allegedly required by the growing “knowl­
edge economy,” and political to legitimize economic ﬂexibility and the loss 
of social rights (Fairclough 2000). Some of Labour’s measures, such as the 
introduction of top-up fees, were intended to preserve the compensatory 
principle (Labour Party 2005, 40) but encountered strong opposition from 
students and from Conservatives for jeopardizing equality of opportunity and 
discouraging “good students” from college by the burden of loans that they 
would have to repay even when their incomes were low (Conservative Party 
2001). 
This recent Conservative interest in the less advantaged in society was 
embedded under the Compassionate Conservatism label (Olasky 2000), used 
in the United Kingdom by William Hague and Duncan Smith and proliferated 
later by David Cameron. This implied a change in concern, from lowering 
public spending to improving citizens’ lives—in particular, those of the 
poor—in an attempt to derail the social democrats’ greatest rhetorical ad­
vantage: their monopoly claim on caring about the worst-off (Magnet 1999; 
Dorey 2007). Following this view, government has a responsibility not to 
redistribute the wealth of citizens but to provide underprivileged individuals 
with skills and opportunities to create their own wealth—similar to New 
Labour’s Third Way postulates. Market mechanisms are seen as efﬁcient tools 
to organize the economy and the community—in particular, faith-based or­
ganizations—to manage the delivery of social services (Evans 2008). Whereas 
the Third Way had moved Labour to the Right, Conservatives became ready 
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to give up on some of those aspects that in the past had detached them from 
middle England and to move to the center, squeezing the political spectrum. 
Compassionate Conservatism, in this way, became a rejoinder of the Third 
Way (Kuypers et al. 2003). 
Conclusions 
The initial treatment of education in the manifestos of both parties con­
formed to Wilensky’s (2002) thesis that social democratic parties accord 
greater importance to education than do conservative parties, up to the HE 
level, at which point the emphasis is reversed. However, since the mid-1990s 
and up to 2010 the Labour Party—in the discourse of New Labour—gave 
increasing prominence to HE, and to education in general (see Boix 1998). 
Yet there was a marked narrowing in the rhetorical differences of both parties 
in this period, as a result of Labour’s move toward positions previously de­
fended by the Conservatives. This ﬁnding is consistent with the global trends 
presented in the education literature reviewed above. While an increasing 
emphasis on education became a deﬁning characteristic of Labour, which 
communicated its messages more emphatically and clearly than did the Con­
servatives, Labour’s message became nonetheless more an abridged version 
of the Conservatives’ and less a reﬂection of Labour’s own identity and sin­
gularity than in the past. 
This narrowing of differences in Conservative and Labour positions was 
not uniform across topics. There was greater convergence in relation to 
arguments that support the need for diversiﬁcation of HE institutions and, 
more fundamentally, in relation to discussions on HE’s purpose and results. 
HE received a new univocal mandate to create the workforce required by 
the private sector, knowledge for industry, and more general economic de­
velopment. Greater differences continued in relation to access, ﬁnancing, 
and management. Regarding access, the Conservative Party was initially in 
favor of the expansion of the HE system, a move that would favor the middle 
classes. This could be achieved, the party contended, not through greater 
spending, which would have contradicted its aim to contain all public spend­
ing, but through increased efﬁciency in spending and in ending the binary 
divide, upgrading polytechnics to university status to lead to a massive ex­
pansion of the system (Conservative Party 1992). 
Although this could be seen as a progressive movement akin to the ending 
of tracking at the primary levels (Trow 1998), in reality the move aimed to 
diversify the HE system and enhance the vocational character of much of its 
provision, while reducing costs per unit in the system. In effect, this expansion 
came from lower-tier providers, which led to accusations of class bias and 
“watering down the system.” Yet it ﬁt with instrumental views of HE at the 
time and satisﬁed the aspirations of many families to send their children to 
HE in a cost-effective way. The associated Conservative discourses deﬂected 
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government responsibility for individual well-being: as access to HE increased, 
so did the emphasis on individual responsibility to be economically inde­
pendent. Conservatives defended the public subsidy of fees, which favored 
the upper and middle classes, given the social structure in the United King­
dom and the lack of a sufﬁciently developed grant system. 
Labour, by contrast, defended a more targeted approach inspired by the 
compensatory principle, to which it would direct much of the additional 
revenue raised through the introduction of variable fees. It also adopted a 
wider view on the obstacles to HE access facing different socioeconomic 
groups and proposed a new set of policy measures particularly based on 
information campaigns on HE beneﬁts. 
In terms of the management of the system, Conservatives defended the 
need for greater efﬁciency of the HE system and have turned their discourse 
in recent times toward more neoliberal positions, focusing on institutional 
ﬁnancial autonomy, provider competition, choice, and specialization. Labour 
has not fully followed rhetorically in this respect—at least not yet. 
The observed narrowing of political discourses can be explained with 
reference to “median voter” arguments, which assume that parties are mo­
tivated by winning elections more than by an enduring commitment to par­
ticular policies or constituencies ( Jackman 1975). Jonas Pontusson and David 
Rueda (2010) report that in the past few decades the median voter has 
become more conservative in advanced industrialized countries. Against re­
formist arguments that increased social rights would increase freedom for 
workers, it would appear that since the 1950–60s there has been a decrease 
in the power, or an increase in the risk aversion, of the middle classes that 
makes it more difﬁcult for them to make claims to protect the social beneﬁts 
they had achieved in the previous decades. In any case, the move of the 
median voter to the right at least partly explains the developments outlined 
above: as the median voter moved to the right, Labour followed in an attempt 
to win elections. Ideologically, this has been difﬁcult, as it could be perceived 
as a betrayal of former principles, policies, and values. In this respect, the 
recourse to rhetorical arguments has exploited the potential of external cir­
cumstances such as globalization, competitiveness, and their association with 
instrumentally conceived notions of lifelong learning—rather than election-
winning motives—to justify this change (Pierson 1996). In the United King­
dom, as in other nations, social democracy lost part of its distinct identity to 
enable New Labour to become electorally successful (Callagham and Tunney 
2001). 
New Labour and later Compassionate Conservatism argue that what mat­
ters is what works rather than ideology. Ideology is thus presented as outdated, 
rigid, dogmatic. However, disavowing ideology is not the same as overcoming 
it, since the pragmatic face of “what works” begs important questions about 
how one determines whether something is “working” and for whom (Reyes 
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2007). Therefore, the disavowal is, in itself, an ideological discourse. What 
we have seen is a move to the right by social democrats, creating a near 
consensus at the center, from which neither party seemed to deviate. Rather, 
the aim is to conquer the center through symbolic measures and palatable 
discourses for the median voter, at least on HE matters. 
As a result, we have witnessed a transformation of the role of education 
in electoral campaigns during the period reviewed. Labour made this area 
less subject to “horizontal” debates (on the Right-Left continuum) by ap­
proximating its position to that of the Conservatives. Conservatives responded 
with a Compassionate Conservatism that further squeezes differences—at 
least for the time being. However, this has not meant that education became 
an electorally irrelevant topic. The fact that an issue is “vertical”—that there 
is a broad agreement on its objectives—does not mean that parties cannot 
“make it work” electorally, as the electorate still prioritizes vertical goals (Cail­
laud and Tirole 2002) and parties still need to be credible in their likely 
delivery (Green 2007). In a world in which politicians cannot seriously pursue 
all possible objectives during their term in ofﬁce, they have to select which 
vertical issue to emphasize, identifying the most relevant concerns of the 
public. New Labour gave greater rhetorical importance to education from 
1997, making it a core Labour area; Conservatives played catch-up. 
How the Conservatives can take this further in future elections is a ques­
tion upon which the British education literature has remained rather evasive. 
There is no turn toward less instrumental strands of conservative thinking 
on education in sight. David Cameron argued that the difﬁculties his Con­
servative Party has experienced since the late 1990s were the product of 
success rather than failure; that is, his party enjoyed victory in the “battle of 
ideas” with the Labour Party (Evans 2008). If the Conservatives ﬁght for the 
center convincingly, they may well reap electoral beneﬁts. In majoritarian 
systems faced with two major parties—as is the case in the United Kingdom— 
that both appeal to the center but cannot fully commit to the median voter, 
middle-class voters will be concerned that the center-left party may succumb 
to radicals within it and reduce beneﬁts to the middle class while increasing 
taxes. They may also be concerned that center-right governments could aban­
don their electoral platform and cut middle-class beneﬁts, but there will be 
an expectation of offsetting cuts in taxes to avoid an openly regressive out­
come. 
Whether for reasons of ethics or political stability, the scope for state 
redistribution from the poor and middle classes to the rich seems to be limited 
in advanced democracies. This produces a disadvantage for the Left in ma­
joritarian systems, which is precisely the opposite of the bias in proportional 
representation systems (Iversen and Soskice 2006). The reconstruction of the 
Conservatives to the center, however, may face both internal resistance (Dorey 
2007) and external confusion by its traditional constituencies (Evans 2008). 
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To implement the “compassionate” promises of the party, the Conservatives 
would likely require increased revenues, which would make it difﬁcult to 
promise signiﬁcant tax cuts. An alternative would be to wait for a swing in 
public views about the importance of new issues that Conservatives could 
make their own, as Labour did with education, or to provide the electorate 
with a more credible “managerial alternative” than Labour’s. A third alter­
native would be a long-term alliance with the Liberal Party, but this is unlikely. 
In fact, the Conservative-Liberal coalition government created after the 2010 
elections (the ﬁrst such coalition after the Second World War) faced impor­
tant difﬁculties from its inception, derived at least in part from the funda­
mental contradictions in the two parties’ electoral promises on HE and, more 
speciﬁcally, in relation to HE tuition fees. The Liberals, who had advocated 
the elimination of student fees in their electoral manifesto, modiﬁed their 
position as part of their Coalition deal. This caused splintering within the 
Liberal Party and student demonstrations. The consequences for the public 
image of the party were signiﬁcant, with plummeting support in the elec­
torate; the issue has even been labeled “toxic” for the Liberals (Harris 2011). 
Finally, the analysis has revealed two important points for the educational 
literature. First, there is a need to establish a more systematic dialogue with 
political science and related disciplines. Second, there may be beneﬁt from 
focusing more strongly on a meso-level of analysis in order to avoid, on the 
one hand, functionalist and globalization approaches, which overemphasize 
commonalities and convergences between parties’ discourses across all ed­
ucation areas and aspects and, on the other hand, detailed narratives that 
overemphasize party positions’ uniqueness and divergence. 
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